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Magical ideation and belief in the paranormal is considered to represent a trait-like character;
people either believe in it or not. Yet, anecdotes indicate that exposure to an anomalous
event can turn skeptics into believers. This transformation is likely to be accompanied by
altered cognitive functioning such as impaired judgments of event likelihood. Here, we
investigated whether the exposure to an anomalous event changes individuals’ explicit
traditional (religious) and non-traditional (e.g., paranormal) beliefs aswell as cognitive biases
that have previously been associated with non-traditional beliefs, e.g., repetition avoidance
when producing random numbers in a mental dice task. In a classroom, 91 students saw a
magic demonstration after their psychology lecture. Before the demonstration, half of the
students were told that the performance was done respectively by a conjuror (magician
group) or a psychic (psychic group). The instruction inﬂuenced participants’ explanations
of the anomalous event. Participants in the magician, as compared to the psychic group,
were more likely to explain the event through conjuring abilities while the reverse was
true for psychic abilities. Moreover, these explanations correlated positively with their prior
traditional and non-traditional beliefs. Finally, we observed that the psychic group showed
more repetition avoidance than the magician group, and this effect remained the same
regardless of whether assessed before or after themagic demonstration.We conclude that
pre-existing beliefs and contextual suggestions both inﬂuence people’s interpretations of
anomalous events and associated cognitive biases. Beliefs and associated cognitive biases
are likely ﬂexible well into adulthood and change with actual life events.
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INTRODUCTION
Magical thinking refers to a thinking style that “involves rea-
soning based on some sort of misconception about, causality,
or about natural laws more generally” (Woolley, 1997 p. 993).
Piaget (1927) showed that up to the age of about 12 years,
magical thinking forms a major part of children’s inner world
(but see Rosengren and Hickling, 1994 for earlier estimates).
Despite reﬁnements to this early claim, recent evidence still sug-
gests that children show a more blurred distinction between
reality and imagination than adults (Rosengren and Hick-
ling, 1994; Woolley, 1997; Subbotsky, 2010). With increasing
age, magical thinking is assumed to dissipate. For example,
children from the age of 5 years replace magical explana-
tions increasingly through rational explanations when seeing
magic tricks (Rosengren and Hickling, 1994). This develop-
mental perspective goes hand in hand with the views that
adults have become rational thinkers shaped through personal,
educational, and societal growth (Rosengren and Hickling,
1994).
While these perspectives might be comfortable in our West-
ern, highly educated society, they are not supported by studies
investigating magical and paranormal beliefs and experiences in
the wider adult population1. For instance, only about 10% of the
general US population would label themselves as being skeptical
toward the paranormal (Rice, 2003). In Europe, 90% of a Swiss
sample reported having exceptional experiences (Landolt et al.,
2014), and the German public seems pretty open-minded about
exceptional experiences, and more than half of the German public
report having had such experiences (Knittel and Schetsche, 2012).
Moreover, after experiencing anomalous events, Western adults
typically deny magical beliefs on an explicit level, but frequently
acknowledge implicitly, that an anomalous event had occurred
(e.g., turning a drawing into a real object; Subbotsky and Quin-
teros, 2002; Subbotsky, 2004). Overall,magical beliefs differ widely
between individuals of different ages (Rosengren and Hickling,
1994; Subbotsky, 2004) as well as between individuals of the same
age (Johnson and Harris, 1994; Subbotsky and Quinteros, 2002).
Once these beliefs are established, they seem to be persistent, and
factors such as education do surprisingly little to diminish the
propensity for these beliefs (Walker et al., 2001; Dougherty, 2004;
Genovese, 2005).
1Based on a recent review, we will treat magical, paranormal, superstitious, and
supernatural beliefs interchangeable (Lindeman and Svedholm, 2012).
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Apart from the observation that magical beliefs are common,
they seem to go along with speciﬁc cognitive biases. For instance,
individuals high as compared to low in magical beliefs more
frequently see patterns in random noise (Brugger et al., 1993;
Blackmore and Moore, 1994), show enhanced illusory face per-
ception (Riekki et al., 2013) or misjudge the probability of events
(Brugger et al., 1990; Bressan, 2002). Moreover, believers are more
likely to accept bogus personality descriptions (Mason and Budge,
2011), report on events that have never occurred (Tsakanikos
and Reed, 2005) and need more time to understand the truth
in sentences that violate core knowledge (Lindeman et al., 2008).
Such cognitive biases might link with the propensity of magical
believers for remote associative processing (Gianotti et al., 2001),
fantasy-proneness (Sanchez-Bernardos andAvia,2006), andopen-
ness to experience (Ross et al., 2002). Thus, the literature suggests
that magical beliefs are common, highly stable (like trait-like
individual differences), and go along with particular cognitive
biases and personality variables. Moreover, magical beliefs have
likely been established in early childhood. Given this conclusion,
it is surprising that relatively little is known about the forma-
tion of such beliefs and the causal role of associated cognitive
biases.
It is possible that little is known aboutmagical belief formation,
at least from adults, because they are considered trait-like, pre-
sumably established in early childhood. Yet, there are numerous
anecdotal reports that magical thinking can emerge in adulthood,
often as a consequence of actual life events. For instance, indi-
viduals who experienced near-death-experiences consequentially
turned into religious and/or spiritual believers (TrueSpritWorship,
2011, 2013). Freud (1946) reports in one of his Introductory Lec-
tures how his interactions and experiences with patients made him
open toward the existence of telepathy and thought-transference.
Being initially very critical and skeptical, he changed his opinion
following numerous case studies on dreams and the occult. He
said “If one regards oneself as a skeptic, it is as well from time to
time to be skeptical about one’s skepticism” (p. 73). Later on he
notes that “[b]ut I am not concerned to seek anyone’s favor, and I
must suggest to you that you should think more kindly of the objec-
tive possibility of thought-transference and therefore also of telepathy
(. . .) it seems to me that one is displaying no great trust in science if
one cannot rely on it to accept and deal with any occult hypothesis
that may turn out to be correct” (p. 75). These examples illus-
trate that actual life events can turn formerly skeptical thinkers
into magical believers, and that belief formation can occur in
adulthood.
In the laboratory, we are aware of a few studies that have
investigated the impact of anomalous experiences on individu-
als’ magical beliefs. For instance, verbal suggestions enhanced
the subjective experience of anomalous events in a fake séance
room (Wiseman et al., 2003), in a ﬁlm presenting psychokinetic
abilities (Wiseman and Greening, 2005), or the impression of
being observed in a supposedly “haunted” room (Bering et al.,
2005). Subbotsky (2004) examined whether adults’ causal beliefs
are affected by the presentation of anomalous (magical) causal
events. When exposed to a magic trick within a magical context
(mind-over-matter magic spell), adults were unwilling to accept
that the magic action (spell) could have caused the anomalous
event. When the anomalous event was not presented within a
magical context, but an unrelated event was executed during the
anomalous event (e.g., switching a light on and off), adults were
prone to causally link the unrelated event with the anomalous
event. Thus, while rejecting the possibility of anomalous events
explicitly, adults’ implicit behavior showed that the possibility of
an anomalous event was nevertheless acknowledged (Subbotsky,
2001).
Most relevant to our study, Benassi et al. (1980) argued that
both the public and scientists can be fooled into attributing
psychic powers to ordinary and amateur magic routines, and
that attributed psychic powers might prevail, even when the
performer labels himself as a conjuror. In their study, a magi-
cian presented magic tricks in the classroom. The magician was
either introduced as a psychic (psychic condition) or a magician
(magician condition). After observing the demonstration, par-
ticipants in the psychic as compared to the magician condition
explained the event more strongly via psychic abilities. While this
experimental manipulation is promising in showing that fram-
ing inﬂuences how people interpret an anomalous event, the
authors did not assess magical beliefs and reasoning about the
event before and after the demonstration. This omission renders
causal inferences difﬁcult. Yet, overall this is a promising approach
to investigate how actual life events inﬂuence our magical beliefs
in adulthood.
In sum, the studies above show that experiencing anoma-
lous events can change people’s magical interpretations (and
potentially beliefs). These events might also inﬂuence cognitive
biases that are commonly associated with trait-like magical beliefs.
Empirical evidence for such causal claims is still missing. Our aim
was to investigate whether the exposure to a magical demonstra-
tion, and its contextual presentation (framing), would inﬂuence
(i) how the event is interpreted (psychic event, conjuring trick,
religious miracle, see also Benassi et al., 1980), (ii) self-reported
traditional (religious, henceforth TB) and non-traditional (e.g.,
magical, paranormal, henceforth NTB) beliefs (Tobacky, 2004),
and (iii) judgments of event likelihood (repetition avoidance in
a random number generation task; Brugger et al., 1990). Former
studies have found stronger repetition avoidance in believers in
the paranormal compared to skeptics (Brugger et al., 1990), and as
the mental number generation task can be performed in a class-
room, it was deemed ideal for the current context. In our study,
students saw the same magic demonstration and received either
the psychic information or the magician information (random
allocation, in written format; see also Benassi et al., 1980). As
participants saw the same demonstration, but having received
different contextual information, we could investigate whether
this framing results in more psychic explanations, NTB, and rep-




The psychology lecture of that day was attended by 91 students
(17 male) with a mean age of 20.5 years (SD = 4.12 years).
This gender distribution is common in psychology courses. All
students were ﬁrst year Psychology undergraduate students at
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1542 | 2
Mohr et al. Magic and belief
Goldsmiths – University of London who participated for course
credits. The study was approved by the departmental ethics board,
and each participant provided written informed consent prior to
the experiment.
SELF-REPORT BELIEF QUESTIONNAIRE
Weused the 26-item revised Paranormal Belief Scale fromTobacky
(2004). This scale can be divided into seven subscales measuring
Traditional Religious Belief, Psi, Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiri-
tualism, Extraordinary Life Forms, and Precognition. The four
traditional religious belief items were summed so to represent the
TB score, and the remaining items to represent the NTB score.
Item examples include “Some psychics can accurately predict the
future” (NTB), “Mind reading is not possible” (NTB), and “There
is a heaven and hell” (TB). Items are formulated such that par-
ticipants are asked to answer along a 7-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Accounting for
reverse coded items, the scores are summed so that higher scores
reﬂect greater beliefs. We had no a priori prediction that the
different NTB subscales would be differentially sensitive to our
manipulation. To account for the possibility that TB (or practices)
are nevertheless more sensitive to cultural inﬂuences than NTB
(MacDonald, 1995; Orenstein, 2002) we summed the scores for
the TB score (n = 4 items) and the remaining items into the NTB
score (n = 22 items).
EVENT INTERPRETATION
Benassi et al. (1980) asked participants to write down “comments
opinions and reactions about what they had seen,” and then scored
this qualitative data according to whether participants thought
the performer was a psychic, magician or whether it contained
religious-demonic themes. Instead of collecting qualitative data,
we asked participants to rate on a 7-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), whether the per-
formance was accomplished through (1) paranormal, psychic or
supernatural powers (psychic explanation), (2) ordinary magic
trickery (conjuror explanation), or (3) religious miracles (reli-
gious explanation). We included the religious miracle measure as
it allowed us to compare NB with the extent to which the event
was explained using religious explanations. Secondly, Benassi et al.
(1980) the only comparable study, asked about religious explana-
tions. Thirdly, it provided us with a control condition (not all
beliefs should be endorsed to the same extent).
MENTAL DICE TASK (BRUGGER ETAL., 1990)
Participants received written and verbal instructions to imagine
throwing a dice each time they heard a beep and to write down
the number that they imagined being on top of the dice (66 trials).
Thus, every second for 66 s, we presented a beep produced by
a computer, and the participant was expected to write down a
number for each beep.We calculated the repetitions in the number
sequence (i.e., 1-1, 2-2, 3-3). If the number generation would
be entirely random we would expect participants to produce on
average 11 repetitions. Previous research has shown that we avoid
repetitions, and that this repetition avoidance is even stronger for
individuals with high as compared to low NTB (Brugger et al.,
1990).
PSYCHIC DEMONSTRATION
The psychic demonstrationwas performed by a professionalmagi-
cian and member of the Magic Circle (http://www.themagiccircle.
co.uk). The magician selected a volunteer from the audience. This
female volunteer was asked to write down the names of ﬁve people
who were alive and one deceased person on six pieces of paper.
The magician then placed the pieces of paper upside down on the
table and placed a lit candle on each of the notes. The magician
explained that he was able to use his spiritual powers to contact
the dead and asked the volunteer to blow out all of the candles.
Approximately 20 s after the candles were blown out, one of them
re-ignited and it was the candle that was on top of the piece of
paper associated with the deceased person. The candle (i.e., the
magician) was correct.
PROCEDURE
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the sequence of events. The exper-
iment was conducted as part of a lecture series on current issues
in psychological research and was framed as a demonstration into
psychic abilities. In more detail, participants had attended a lec-
ture on the science of magic (given by Gustav Kuhn) prior to the
actual experiment (see ﬁrst event in Figure 1). In this lecture,
Gustav Kuhn discussed how misdirection can be used to study
visual attention. Subsequently, participants were separated by at
least one seat and were instructed to refrain from communicating
with fellow students throughout the experiment. At this point, all
participants were primed to experience a real psychic demonstra-
tion (second event in Figure 1), i.e., Gustav Kuhn gave them the
following verbal brieﬁng. “As you will be aware, the Anomalistic
Psychology Unit at Goldsmith has a keen interest in investigating
psychic abilities. Over the years we have carried out numerous exper-
iments to test whether the claims made by psychics hold up on closer
FIGURE 1 | Schematic demonstration of the sequence of events for
participants in the magician and in the psychic groups.
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scrutiny. Whilst most of the individuals tested so far generally fail
these tests, we were very fortunate in that we did ﬁnd one person
who passed most of the preliminarily tests (8/10). His name is Lee
and whilst not perfect, his performance was signiﬁcantly better than
chance (p < 0.0032). Lee has told us that he has been developing
a presentation of his psychic abilities, and has asked us if he could
present it to you and get your opinions and reactions. I thought
that this would be very interesting, and so I agreed to let him do
it.” [Overall, and in particular the last sentences, instructions were
paraphrased from Benassi et al. (1980)]. After these general instruc-
tions, participants were given a work booklet that contained all
of the questionnaires and some additional information. Partici-
pantswere randomly assigned to themagicianorpsychic condition
(third event in Figure 1).
Contextual framing instruction for the magic demonstration:
the instruction stated that the anomalous demonstration was
carried out by a magician pretending to do a fake psychic demon-
stration, and they read the following statement: “Some magicians
can perform exactly what psychics claim to be doing using ordinary
stage trickery.” In fact, Lee is not a real psychic, but a professional
magician and member of the Magic Circle. What you are about to
see is a demonstration of Lee’s conjuring skills.
Contextual framing instruction for the psychic demonstration:
the instruction stated that the anomalous demonstration was car-
ried out by a true psychic. They read the following statement “Lee
has worked as a Psychic for several years.” Lee is very highly regarded
by the European Psychic Society and has astonished numerous well-
known scientists by demonstrating his psychic abilities under tightly
controlled conditions.
Immediately afterward, participants ﬁlled out the belief ques-
tionnaire (Tobacky, 2004; Figure 1). Subsequently, theywere asked
to perform the mental dice task (Brugger et al., 1990; fourth event
in Figure 1). Once completed, the lecturer introduced the students
to the magician who performed the psychic demonstration (ﬁfth
event in Figure 1). After the demonstration, the students were
asked to perform the mental dice task again (Brugger et al., 1990;
sixth event in Figure 1). Subsequently, they were asked three ques-
tions on how they explain the event (seventh event in Figure 1):
(1)Whether the performancewas accomplished throughparanormal,
psychic or supernatural powers (psychic explanation), (2) what they
have seenhas been accomplished by ordinarymagic trickery (conjuror
explanation), and (3) what they have seen has been accomplished
by a religious miracle (religious explanations. Finally, participants
completed the belief questionnaire again (Tobacky, 2004; eighth
event in Figure 1), before being fully debriefed about the purpose
of the experiment (ninth event in Figure 1). Here, the magician
explained the method behind the effect.
RESULTS
Five participants provided incomplete data on the mental dice task
and were excluded from further analysis.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTEXTUAL FRAMING AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE EVENT
To investigate how the two groups interpreted the causes of the
anomalous event, we performed a 3×2 ANOVA (analysis of
variance) on the explanation ratings with explanation (psychic,
conjuror, religious) as within-participant factor and instruction
group (psychic,magician) as between-participant factor (Table 1).
This ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main effect of explanation,
F(2,178) = 163, p < 0.00005, η = 0.65. Post hoc t-tests indicated
that participants provided higher conjuror explanation ratings
than psychic and religious explanation ratings, respectively (all
ps < 0.0005). Moreover, the psychic explanation ratings were
higher than the religious explanation ratings (p < 0.00005). There
was no signiﬁcantmain effect of group,F(2,178)= 0.00, p= 0.985,
η = 0.000, but a signiﬁcant group by explanation interaction,
F(2,178) = 6.35, p = 0.002, η = 0.067. Participants in the psychic
group gave higher psychic explanation ratings than participants in
the magician group, t(89) = 2.04, p = 0.044. On the other hand,
participants in the magician group gave higher conjuror explana-
tion ratings than participants in the psychic group, t(89) = 2.77,
p = 0.007. There was no signiﬁcant group difference for the reli-
gious explanation ratings, t(89) = 0.69, p = 0.50 (Table 1). Thus,
the contextual framing inﬂuenced participants’ psychic and con-
juring explanations, but not religious explanations, which were
low for both groups (Table 1).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BASELINE BELIEF AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE EVENT
We correlated participants’ belief scores before the anomalous
event with the explanation ratings after the anomalous event
(psychic, conjuror, religious; Table 2). TB and NTB scores were
both signiﬁcantly correlated with the Psychic and Religious expla-
nation ratings (Table 2). Thus, the higher individuals’ beliefs,
the more likely were psychic and religious explanations (see
also Orenstein, 2002). We also observed a signiﬁcant correla-
tion between NTB scores and conjuring explanation ratings. The
more individuals reported NTB, the less likely were conjuring
explanations.
Table 1 | Mean psychic, conjuror, and religious explanation ratings
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for the







M SD M SD M SD
Psychic 2.82 1.85 5.02 1.70 1.64 1.14
Magician 2.11 1.48 5.89 1.27 1.47 1.20
Table 2 | Pearson correlation coefficients when correlating belief
scores (NTB,TB), as assessed before the anomalous event, with the
three explanation ratings for the event, as assessed after the
anomalous event (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.0005).
NTB scores TB scores
Psychic explanation 0.48** 0.41**
Conjuring explanation −0.26* −0.08
Religious explanation 0.33** 0.41**
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EFFECT OF CONTEXTUAL FRAMING AND ANOMALOUS EVENT ON
EXPLICIT BELIEFS
We investigated whether contextual framing and exposure to
the anomalous event inﬂuenced participants’ TB and NTB as
assessed before and after the demonstration. We made the fol-
lowing assumptions. Firstly, we can attribute group differences in
belief scores assessed before the demonstration to contextual fram-
ing effects. Secondly, we can attribute group differences in belief
scores as assessed after the anomalous event to the experience itself
combined with the contextual framing.
We subjected the TB and NTB scores to separate ANOVAs
with instruction group (psychic, magician) as between-subject
factor and time (before, after) as repeated factor. The ANOVA
on TB found no signiﬁcant main effect of group, F(1,89) = 0.028,
p = 0.87, η = 0.000, no main effect of time, F(1,89) = 2.15,
p = 0.15, η = 0.024, and no group by time interaction,
F(1,89) = 2.15, p = 0.15, η = 0.024 (Table 1). The ANOVA
on NTB showed a marginal, yet non-signiﬁcant main effect of
group, F(1,89) = 2.63, p = 0.055 (one-tailed), η = 0.029, and no
signiﬁcant time by group interaction, F(1,89) = 0.25, p = 0.64,
η= 0.002. The main effect of time was signiﬁcant, F(1,89) = 5.70,
p = 0.019, η = 0.060, wherein NTB scores before the anoma-
lous event were higher than the NTB scores after the event
(Table 3).
EFFECT OF CONTEXTUAL FRAMING AND ANOMALOUS EVENTS ON
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
We performed a 2×2 ANOVA with group (psychic, magician) as
between-subject factor and time (before, after) as repeated factor
on the number of repetitions.We found a signiﬁcantmain effect of
group, F(1,89) = 3.74, p = 0.028 (one-tailed) η= 0.040, no effect
of time F(1,89) = 0.015, p = 0.90, η = 0.000, and no group by
time interaction, F(1,89) = 0.046, p = 0.83, η= 0.001 (Figure 2).
The main effect of group emerged from the magician group pro-
ducing more repetitions than the psychic group. If numbers were
generated entirely randomly, we would expect 11 repetitions. As
shown in Figure 2, participants produced fewer than the expected
11 repetitions. Pearson correlations showed no signiﬁcant correla-
tions between repetition avoidance (before the anomalous event)
and TB scores (r = 0.074, p = 0.49) and NTB scores (r = 0.01,
p = 0.93).
DISCUSSION
We investigated whether exposure to an anomalous event changes
people’s beliefs and associated cognitive biases (i.e., impaired
Table 3 | Mean belief scores (TB, NTB) before and after exposure to the
anomalous event for the psychic and the magician group separately.
Traditional religious belief Non-traditional religious belief
Before After Before After
Group M SD M SD M SD M SD
Psychic 3.85 2.01 3.85 2.10 2.88 1.13 2.77 1.10
Magician 3.84 2.34 3.71 2.19 2.52 0.91 2.44 0.94
FIGURE 2 | Mean number of repetitions in the mental dice task before
and after the demonstration of the anomalous event as a function
of the contextual framing condition (error bars denote standard
errors).
judgments of event likelihood). Students observed a magic
demonstration in a classroom setting and half of the partici-
pants were told that the performer was a magician whilst the
others were told he is a psychic. Subsequently, participants were
asked how they interpreted the demonstration (psychic, conjur-
ing, religious explanations). Participants also ﬁlled in a self-report
belief questionnaire and performed a random number generation
task (mental dice task) before and after the demonstration. Our
results showed that (i) participants gave explanations in predica-
ble ways (the psychic group gave more psychic explanations than
the magic group; the opposite was true for conjuring explana-
tions; religious explanations were overall low and did not differ
between the psychic and the magic group), (ii) baseline belief
scores correlated with explanation ratings (higher TB and NTB
scores correlated with psychic explanations, higher TB scores cor-
related with more religious explanations, and higher NTB scores
but not TB scores correlated with less conjuring explanations),
(iii) the anomalous demonstration had little inﬂuence on self-
reported beliefs (NTB were lower after as compared to before the
demonstration), and (iv) individuals in the psychic group showed
stronger repetition avoidance than individuals in the magician
group.
We will ﬁrst discuss the role of contextual framing on our
dependent measures, (i.e., the NTB scores and repetition avoid-
ance), because the exposure to anomalous events seemed to have
little inﬂuence on peoples’ NTB and associated cognitive biases.
It is possible that exposure to anomalous events has no impact
on NTB and repetition avoidance. While counter to our predic-
tions, this conclusion would support the notion that NTB are
well-established in adulthood and show little change, not even
with scientiﬁc education (Walker et al., 2001; Dougherty, 2004;
Genovese, 2005). Before accepting that NTB and associated cogni-
tive biases are ﬁxed anddonot changewith experience and context,
we conjecture alternative explanations that could account for what
we observed.
Firstly, the explanation ratings after the anomalous demon-
stration indicate that the contextual framing inﬂuenced people’s
experience of the event, or at least their verbal reﬂections. When
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the event was framed as a psychic demonstration, participants
gave more psychic explanations than when it was framed as a
magic demonstration. The reverse was found for conjuring expla-
nations. These results coincide with those reported by Benassi
et al. (1980), who similarly, showed that contextually framing
a psychic demonstration inﬂuenced subsequent event explana-
tions. These observations are supported by independent studies.
For instance, verbal suggestions enhanced the subjective experi-
ence of anomalous events in a fake séance room (Wiseman et al.,
2003), in a ﬁlm presenting psychokinetic abilities (Wiseman and
Greening, 2005), or in a supposedly “haunted” room (Bering
et al., 2005). Subbotsky (2001, 2004) also showed that seemingly
skeptical adults demonstrate behavior that implicitly indicates
the possibility of anomalous explanations. Moreover, when given
hints to explain anomalous events through illusory correlations,
many of these seemingly skeptical adults appreciated explanations
suggested by such correlations.Whilst the effect of framing did not
result in signiﬁcantly different NTB scores, the trend was certainly
in the predicted direction, and our experimental design may have
simply lacked sensitivity in picking up these differences (see also
limitation section).
Secondly, the results from the mental dice task indicate that the
contextual framing was effective. Contextual framing inﬂuenced
a cognitive bias that has previously been associated with trait-like
magical beliefs, i.e., repetition avoidance in a random number
generation task (Brugger et al., 1990). More precisely, participants
in the psychic group showed a higher level of repetition avoidance
than participants in themagician group. This group differencewas
found irrespective of whether they had seen the anomalous event
or not. Thus, cognitive biases associated with beliefs are probably
not stable cognitive biases but are inﬂuenced by the contextual
information and situation. Admittedly, given our initial hypothe-
sis, we predicted that the difference would be particularly apparent
in the psychic group after rather than before the anomalous event
demonstration. Yet, the demonstration itself did not result in any
change in belief scores or cognitive measures, indicating that these
measures seem too well-established to change with the one-off
anomalous experience. The one-off contextual framing event, on
the other hand, was sufﬁciently powerful to transiently change
individuals’ perception and appreciation of the event (Benassi
et al., 1980; Bering et al., 2005;Wiseman and Greening, 2005). Pre-
sumably, the contextual framing event might be so powerful that
the subsequent anomalous experience had no additional impact
on the dependent measures. Alternatively, the actual anomalous
experience may have been too simple to exert any measurable
effects. Future studies should test these possibilities. Particular
suggestions and reﬂections on the powerfulness of the anomalous
event demonstration are detailed in the limitation section.
A ﬁnal observation worth discussing is the drop in NTB scores
after the anomalous event demonstration. We assume that this
drop in NTB scores reﬂects a psychometric artifact resulting from
a repetition bias or response bias, rather than the anomalous
event itself. Previous studies showed that magical ideation was
relatively unstable over a 2 years period (Meyer and Hautzinger,
1999) and that magical ideation was lower in a group that had
received the contextual information that the questionnaire asso-
ciates with psychosis as compared to a group that had received
the contextual information that the questionnaire associates with
creativity (Mohr and Leonards, 2005).
LIMITATIONS
If one takes the original hypothesis, we can conclude that the
contextual framingwas a powerfulmanipulationwhile the anoma-
lous event demonstration was not. In comparison to Benassi et al.
(1980) our participants were generally farmore skeptical about the
anomalous event. Benassi et al. (1980) asked participants to write
down comments, opinions, and reactions about what they had
seen. These comments were later scored according to whether the
individual indicated that he/she thought that the performer was
a psychic or a magician. It is impossible to directly compare this
qualitative data with our own, but the fact that 77% of their partic-
ipants in the psychic condition came up with psychic explanations
illustrates that the majority of participants attributed the anoma-
lous event to a psychic cause. This is in stark contrast to our own
data, where on average participants “slightly” to “moderately” dis-
agreed with the idea that the anomalous event was accomplished
through psychic powers. It is likely that our magic demonstration
might have been less striking, and by inference less inﬂuential on
beliefs and cognitive biases, than the contextual framing manip-
ulation. For instance, Benassi et al. (1980) used a whole range of
psychic demonstrations (mindreading, teleportation, metal bend-
ing). We, on the other hand, used a simple magic trick that could
(with some training) be performed by novice magicians. Thus,
future magic demonstrations should include several tricks and
extend the demonstration in duration. Moreover, we tested par-
ticipants in a classroom subsequent to a psychology lecture on
the science of magic. Thus, these students were fully aware that
the experimenter (Gustav Kuhn) has a keen interest and expe-
rience in conjuring. It is likely that our participants were more
skeptical about the authenticity of the psychic performance than
a naïve audience would have been. Moreover, as our participants
were predominantly female, we cannot guarantee that our results
generalize to males.
In addition, our participants received the actual contextual
framing instructions in written format. We do not know whether
they read this instruction properly or not. In Benassi et al. (1980)
participants in the two groups were tested at two different occa-
sions receiving the instructions verbally by the experimenter. As
it is impossible to guarantee that each performance is identical,
we favored the model in which all participants are exposed to the
same performance, but participants are given different written
instructions. Despite these caveats and methodological differ-
ences between studies, we suggest that the overall methodological
approach is promising. In particular, despite the simplicity of our
magic trick, the classroom setting, having just had a lecture on the
science of magic, our participants did not fully dismiss a psychic
explanation.
For future studies, we also suggest to consider the context in
which an anomalous event is performed. For example, a spiri-
tual reading carried out in a real séance room is likely to be more
powerful than when the same demonstration is presented in a
classroom context (Wiseman et al., 2003). Moreover, true séances
are typically carried out by people with a very strong conviction in
the phenomena (Wiseman et al., 2003), something our magician
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somewhat lacked. Another concern is the repeated use of the belief
questionnaire in short succession. Ideally, participants would
receive different belief questionnaires that are yet comparable in
what they measure, or even better, a well-established belief ques-
tionnaire would be split into two comparable halves so that the
ﬁrst half could be provided prior to the presentation and the other
half subsequent to the presentation. Due to the comparability of
the two halves, the change in scores could be assessed directly.
Finally, we might ﬁnd stronger effects for non-student popula-
tions as suggested by the ﬁndings of Bressan (2002). Her ﬁndings
indicated that links between impaired probability judgments and
paranormal beliefs are less pronounced in students than in regular
workers of varying education.
We outline another concern not covered extensively so far.
Benassi et al. (1980) performed a between-subject design in which
participants in the psychic group were tested at a different occa-
sion to those tested in the magician group. The formulation of the
contextual framing was matched for the ﬁrst part of the instruc-
tion, but differed later between conditions. The magician aimed to
perform the demonstration comparably across the different test-
ing sessions. In our study, we preferred to make sure that each
participant saw exactly the same performance so that possible per-
formance differences or audience effects would not differ between
the magician and psychic group. We formulated the instructions
such that they would be suggestive but be free of personal opin-
ion. Indeed, in Benassi et al. (1980) some instructions included a
personal judgment of the experimenter. The verbatim instruction
in the psychic instruction included for example “I thought that
would be interesting, even though I’m not convinced personally
of Craig’s or anyone else’s psychic abilities, so I agreed to let him do
it” (p. 3). In the strong magic condition, the experimenter added
“In his act, Craig will pretend to read minds and demonstrate psy-
chic abilities; but Craig does not really have psychic abilities, and
what you’ll be seeing are really only tricks” (p. 3). We do not know
to what extent such different formulations add to the observed
results by enhancing or attenuating possible effects. However, the
careful matching of verbal instruction is advisable.
CONCLUSION
The present study investigated whether the exposure to an anoma-
lous eventwould result in a change inNTBandassociated cognitive
biases. We take the current ﬁndings as promising evidence that
exposure to an anomalous event (or its announcement) can inﬂu-
ence participants’ evaluation of the event together with associated
cognitive biases. We conclude that such ﬁndings are key to show-
ing that magical beliefs and associated cognitive biases are ﬂexible,
not necessarily trait-like, and that this ﬂexibility is possible well
into adulthood. We discuss the necessity to further evaluate which
types of demonstrations are powerful to lead to belief change if
not belief formation. In any case, the current paradigm is promis-
ing in showing causal (rather than correlational) factors in belief
change, belief formation and the role of associated cognitive biases
in these processes.
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